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NEUROSCIENCE'S NEW TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATING




Cesare Lombroso, the nineteenth century Italian criminologist, pro-
posed a theory of criminality suggesting that criminal behavior was biologi-
cally derived and could be predicted by various physiognomic features.1
This concept was also promoted by Franz Joseph Gall, who proposed that
higher mental functions were localized in specific and distinct areas of the
brain.2 Gall believed these regions were marked by features on the cranium
(phrenology), as did Lombroso.3 Lombroso was so confident in his theory
that he proposed that those individuals who exhibited the appropriate physi-
cal features be irrevocably detained for life.
Modem localization hypotheses (a phrenology of social cognition) at-
tempt to identify specific areas of the brain associated with personality or
social psychological constructs.5 With the advent of neuroimaging technol-
ogy, noninvasive brain scans have been used in attempts to identify neural
mechanisms involved in romantic love, 6 deception detection,7 racial prefe-
* Circuit Judge, 18-W Judicial Circuit; Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University
of Arkansas School of Law; B.S.A., University of Arkansas (1966); M.S. University of Mis-
souri (1968); J.D. University of Missouri-Kansas City (1971); M.S. University of Missouri
(1976); M.J.S. University of Nevada-Reno (2008).
1. Steven K. Erickson, Minding Moral Responsibility: The Supreme Court's Recent
Mental Health Rulings, 8 ENGAGE 59, 59 (2007). See also Giuseppe Carri & Francesco
Barale, Cesare Lombroso, MD., 1835-1909, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 624, 624 (2004).
2. Martin Sarter, Gary G. Berntson & John T. Cacioppo, Brain Imaging and Cognitive
Neuroscience: Toward Strong Inference in Attributing Functions to Structure, 51 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 13, 15 (1996).
3. Id.
4. T. B. Benning, Neuroimaging Psychopathy: Lessons from Lombroso, 183 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 563, 563-64 (2003) (citing STEPHEN JAY GOULD, EVER SINCE DARWIN:
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY (1977)).
5. John T. Cacioppo, Tyler S. Lorig, Gary G. Berntson, Catherine J. Norris, Edith
Rickett & Howard Nusbaum, Just Because You're Imaging the Brain Doesn't Mean You Can
Stop Using Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 650, 654 (2003).
6. See id. at 657-58 (reviewing Andreas Bartels & Semir Zeki, The Neural Basis of
Romantic Love, 11 NEuROREPORT 3829, 3829-34 (2000)).
7. See Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro
Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 426-29 (2007). See also Joelle Anne Moreno,
The Future of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 717, 735 (2009).
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rences and prejudices, 8 sexual arousal, 9 ethical decision making,' ° and con-
sumer preferences," among others. More relevant, studies related to neural
topographies of aggression suggest that some criminal behavior may be
correlated with brain abnormalities. 12 This may be, as some commentators
suggest, "phrenological folly," or it may indicate that areas of the brain
may, at some point, be identified as predicting violent behavior.' 3 Lombroso
would be proud.
II. PREDICTING FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
Predictions of criminal behavior, especially future dangerousness, have
become an important function of the legal system. Such assessments are
important in bail determinations, parole decisions, capital case sentencing,
sexually violent predator assessments, involuntary civil commitments, and
in sex offender registration.
14
Dangerousness is a legitimate concern for courts in any pretrial release
decision. The federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 specifically authorizes a
court to consider the "nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or
the community" that would be posed by pretrial release of those charged
with a specific category of serious offenses. 5 In upholding this act, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority on the United States Supreme
Court, found no constitutional barrier to permitting a court, after an adver-
sarial hearing, from finding that no conditions of pretrial release could as-
sure the safety of the community or of any person.16 The government would
have to present clear and convincing evidence of a "demonstrable danger."' 7
Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted a prior case to the effect that "'there is noth-
ing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct." 8
In most states a parole board must assess the likelihood of future of-
fenses in evaluating a prisoner for early release. This evaluation often con-
8. Tovino, supra note 7, at 431-34.
9. Id. at 434-35.
10. Id. at435-37.
11. Id. at 437-39.
12. Dean Mobbs, Hakwan C. Lau, Owen D. Jones & Christopher D. Frith, Law, Re-




14. Predictions of future behavior are of consequence to psychiatrists and psychologists,
given the growing concern for potential tort liability as illustrated in decisions such as Tara-
soffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The implications of new tech-
niques of neuroscience for such considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (2006).
16. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 759 (1987).
17. Id. at 750.
18. Id. at 752 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
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siders dangerousness as one factor in this decision. 19 An important consid-
eration in some states with death penalty provisions is the necessity of a jury
finding that a defendant charged with a capital crime is likely to repeat the
act. In other states, the likelihood of repetition is at least an "aggravating
factor" that the jury may consider. Expert testimony about future dange-
rousness was approved in Barefoot v. Estelle, a 1984 decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States.
Some states have enacted sexually violent predator acts that allow for
civil commitment of persons found likely to engage in future acts of sexual
violence due to a current mental abnormality or personality disorder.2' Such
acts require an assessment of future dangerousness by a court similar to the
evaluation required for any other involuntary civil commitment. The added
factor for consideration in such cases is proof of a current mental condition
that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future.22
Ordinary involuntary civil commitment statutes in most states require a
finding by a court that the person is a danger to himself or to others. Once
the person is committed, reevaluation is usually left to the medical authori-
24ties. However, if the person is committed following criminal proceedings
in which the person was found to be either incompetent to stand trial or not
guilty by reason of insanity, some states require follow-up hearings by the
court to determine if the person should be released. One factor to consider
is the likelihood of future dangerousness.26
Most states have enacted sex offender registration legislation requiring
those convicted of specified sex offenses to register upon release from in-
carceration or if placed on probation.27 These registration statutes normally
19. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.1214(1)(c) (1999) (requiring a panel, includ-
ing a psychologist or psychiatrist, to certify that a prisoner "does not represent a high risk to
reoffend," in order to be eligible for parole in Nevada, when convicted of specified offenses);
Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1994) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that
Georgia's State Board of Pardons and Paroles uses a "Parole Success Likelihood Score,"
which was developed using large samples of parolees and considers prior and current incar-
ceration for violent offenses).
20. 463 U.S. 880, 900-01 (1984), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2) (2000), as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474-75 (2000).
21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq. (Furse 2005). This legislation was
found to be constitutional in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). At least fifteen other
states and the District of Columbia have similar provisions. See Erica Beecher-Monas &
Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for
Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 309 n.40 (2006).
22. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 308-09.
23. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-47-207, -210 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
24. See id. § 20-47-207; id. § 5-2-3 10 (LEXIS Repl. 2006).
25. See id. § 5-2-310.
26. See id. §§ 20-47-207, -210; id. § 5-2-310.
27. See id. § 12-12-906 (LEXIS Repl. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005).
This registration requirement is known informally as "Megan's Law" in New Jersey and was
enacted on the federal level by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Act in 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (codified as amended
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require a risk assessment to determine the exact registration requirements.28
This risk assessment evaluates the likelihood of reoffending.
29
The proliferation of these statutes illustrates our criminal justice sys-
tem's subtle shift in focus away from punishment and onto prevention.30
Although this legislation has passed constitutional muster when tested, the
difficulty of accurately predicting future dangerousness has raised the ques-
tion of whether this statutory focus is based on a dubious premise. For this
reason, a claim of violation of due process might provide for a successful
challenge in the future.3'
III. DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Barefoot v.
Estelle, considered future dangerousness as an aggravating factor in capital
cases.32 Writing in dissent, Justice Blackmun expressed concern about the
ability of mental health professionals to reliably predict long-term future
dangerousness. 33 He cited the amicus brief of the American Psychiatric As-
sociation that suggested such predictions were wrong two out of three
times. 34 At that time such predictions were based on clinical assessments.
35
In the intervening years, actuarial or statistical methods have emerged
which purport to be much more accurate. These methods evaluate a number
of risk factors which are scored to yield an objective measure and are
claimed by some researchers to be reliable predictors of future dangerous-
ness.36 Other researchers believe these methods are only "moderately pre-
dictive. 37
at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)).
28. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-906.
29. See id. § 12-12-913(c)(2)(A) (requiring that "factors relevant to a sex offender's
future dangerousness" be identified in the assessment); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11.
30. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001). See also Christopher Slobogin, A
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (2003) (providing case exam-
ples).
31. See Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 56, 66-67 (2004). See also Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora's Box: Sexual
Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 1233, 1233 (2004)
(presenting specific examples).
32. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
33. Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Id. Justice White, writing for the majority, dismissed this concern and indicated that
juries could competently evaluate any shortcomings of expert testimony. Id. at 899-903.
35. See id.
36. See generally JOHN MONAHAN et al., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001) (addressing how clinical
tools can help anticipate violent behavior).
37. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 302 n.5. See also 0. Carter
Snead, Neuroimaging and Capital Punishment, 19 THE NEW ATLANTIS 35, 38-39 (2008)
("The use of cognitive neuroimaging data to diagnose psychological conditions relies entire-
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Thomas R. Litwack reviewed the literature on the relative merits of
clinical and actuarial assessments and concluded that the latest research
does not demonstrate that actuarial assessments are superior, especially with
regard to dangerousness. 38 He points out that such assessments are frequent-
ly used to determine whether confinement should occur or continue. 39 This
makes the clinical determination (or judicial determination) a "judgment" as
to whether the patient poses a risk of harm to himself or others within a fu-
ture time span.40 However, it is not a prediction of violence.41 This point is
illustrated by Jones v. United States, where the Court found that confine-
ment could be justified on proof of something less than the likelihood of a
violent act.42 A nonviolent act of attempted theft (a finding of dangerous-
ness) could justify confinement.43
Litwack points out that clinical practitioners may consider available
actuarial data if they are relevant and meaningful.44 Likewise, actuarial in-
struments are based on clinical assessment of clinical variables (i.e., psy-
chiatric diagnosis).45 He concludes that actuarial methods are not yet supe-
rior to clinical assessments.46
Because the "unaided abilities of mental health professionals to per-
form [the] task [of violence risk assessment] are modest at best," the Ma-
cArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study helps evaluate risk factors for
violence and develop a risk assessment tool for use by clinicians.47 Using
106 risk factors commonly available in hospital records or clinical assess-
ments, the MacArthur Study places its patients into one of five risk
classes. 48 There was a seventy-six percent probability of violence within
twenty weeks of discharge for the highest risk group, and a one percent
probability for the lowest risk group.49 The approach is claimed to be highly
accurate (compared to other actuarial methods), and it involves a complex
computational model for which software has been developed.5
ly on the soundness of the diagnostic criteria-which, given the absence of specific biologi-
cal markers for any psychiatric disorder, can be hotly contested.").
38. See Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 409, 409 (2001).
39. See id. at 425.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
43. Id. at 380.
44. Litwack, supra note 38, at 412-13.
45. Id. at412-13.
46. Id. at 437-38.
47. The MacArthur Research Network, The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study: Executive Summary, April 2001, http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last





One criticism of these risk-assessment approaches, regardless of accu-
racy, is that they are based on group data and not on an individualized as-
sessment of dangerousness. 51 Although risk assessments based on group
data "may help identify populations that are likely to demonstrate an ele-
vated recidivism rate and the judgment of dangerousness may thus be in-
formed by this information, the dangerousness judgment cannot be reduced
to a score on an assessment device or to the diagnostic assessment of an
expert., 52 Nor do these assessments address the normative component of the
dangerousness judgment-the "moral inquiry that determines what particu-
lar threshold of risk justifies a particular legal consequence. 53
IV. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
In spite of the confidence expressed in recent studies that the psychia-
tric and psychological communities can accurately predict future dange-
rousness, the search for new tools to aid in that endeavor continues. Recent-
ly, new developments in behavioral genetics have raised the question of
whether more accurate predictions of future dangerousness might be re-
vealed in genetic codes.54 Research on the "biology of violence" suggests
that genes may influence behavior.55 But, as stated by Beecher-Monas and
Garcia-Rill, "[a]ll behavior is a complex intermingling of nature and nur-
ture. 56 Behavior also affects genes.57
Beecher-Monas and Garcia-Rill advise caution in reading too much in-
to the conclusions of "Neo-Darwinian hardliners," who would explain flaws
of human behavior in purely genetic terms. 8 They point out that,
"[u]nfortunately, another easy answer to the problem of crime control-
finding a genetic basis for executing or locking up a violent individual and
throwing away the key-is similarly unsupported by evidence, 59 and their
research findings forcibly conclude that "[g]enetic determinism is simply
unfounded when it comes to complex behavior.,
60
The latest developments are from neuroscience. Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is capable of measuring brain function and has
been proposed as a technique for studying everything from lie detection,
sexual arousal and ethical decision making, to racial preferences and preju-
51. See Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz, Marc W. Pearce & Robert F. Schopp, Dangerous-




54. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 303-04.
55. Id. at 302-03.
56. Id. at 324.
57. Id. at 333-34.
58. Id. at 338-39.
59. Id. at 340.
60. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 340.
[Vol. 32
2010] NEUROSCIENCE AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 307
dices.6' A second type of technology in development is the so-called "brain
fingerprinting" technique, which uses electroencephalography (EEG) to
record electrical signals from the brain.62 A third type is the computed to-
mography (CT) scans, which depict a difference in density of various types
of brain tissue.63
While it does not seem out of the ordinary to use such technology to
evaluate brain structure and, to some degree, brain function, it is less likely
that such technology will be used in the immediate future to explain beha-
vior or to predict future behavior.64 Nevertheless, such technology could be
used in the types of proceedings outlined above-to predict future dange-
rousness.65 In a dramatic expression of faith in such technology, the British
Home Secretary indicated in 2007 that convicted pedophiles would be re-
quired to undergo brain scans by MRI to aid in assessing the likelihood of
reoffending. 66 Such potential uses are based on the premise that "some kinds
of criminal behavior are associated with dysfunction of different regions of
the brain."67 Studies demonstrate that violent individuals and convicted
criminals do have prefrontal cortex abnormalities and that other areas of the
brain may have dysfunctions as well.68 Neuroimaging may reveal these dys-
functions.
To be clear, there is at present no reason to believe that all crimi-
nal behaviours, or indeed even all violent criminal behaviours, are
the result of organically dysfunctional brains. However, there is
ample evidence to suggest that some kinds of dysfunction are
likely to increase the probability of some kinds of behaviours that
society labels as criminal.69
One of the frequently cited studies was performed by Raine, Lencz,
Bihrle, LaCasse, and Colletti, using magnetic resonance imaging to study
brains of subjects identified with antisocial personality disorder (APD).7
61. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the
US. Courts, 26 BEHAV. Sc1. & L. 29, 30-35 (2008).
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 47-49 (explaining that the images portrayed are reliable and that the prob-
lem is in the meaning and interpretations of the images).
65. See Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 322 (2007). The author suggests such uses may be
offered just as they might be used to suggest a person is not responsible for his or her actions,
for example, in an insanity defense. Id. at 334-36.
66. Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture and Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHiATRY & L. 239, 239 (2009).
67. See Mobbs et al., supra note 12, at e103.0695.
68. Id. at e103.0695-e103.0696 (citing studies indicating that alternations in blood flow
have been noted by neuroscientists in the frontal lobes of violent individuals and convicted
criminals).
69. Id. at e103.0696.
70. Adrian Raine, Todd Lencz, Susan Bihrle, Lori LaCasse & Patrick Colletti, Reduced
Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 57 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119, 119 (2000).
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Raine and the others observed a reduction in prefrontal gray matter volume
in patients with APD, suggesting that the volume deficit may be related to
antisocial, psychotic behavior.7' Similar studies of violent offenders indicate
dysfunction in the frontal cortex.7 2 Furthermore, neuroimaging studies con-
firm that amygdala dysfunction is associated with psychopathy in violent
offenders.
7 3
These attempts to identify the neuropsychiatric basis for violent beha-
vior have caused some to question the relevance of these studies to the issue
of criminal responsibility. 74 Criminal responsibility is a legal concept, but
understanding the nature of causes of psychiatric-based disabilities can "in-
form us about the proportionate role that a biological deficit or a person's
choices may have had in generating a behavior., 75 The new technology of
fMRI may offer a path to applied forensic imaging in the future.76
V. LEGAL QUESTIONS
The use of this emerging technology for the evaluation of future dan-
gerousness for any of the purposes outlined above raises a number of legal
questions. First, there is the basic issue of whether the present state of the
science can meet the standards for admissibility in judicial proceedings.
Second, Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination issues might be raised if pros-
ecutors use these techniques in a criminal proceeding. Third, questions as to
whether a reasonable search was conducted may arise if these techniques
are deemed to constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Beyond these basic
legal considerations, there are right-to-privacy issues that arise when an
individual is held responsible for thoughts instead of actions.77
71. Id. at 123.
72. James R. Blair, Neurobiological Basis of Pyschopathy, 182 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 5,
5 (2003).
73. Id.
74. See J. Arturo Silva, The Relevance of Neuroscience to Forensic Psychiatry, 35 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 6-9 (2007) (outlining the views of Michael Gazzaniga, a
neuroscientist, and Stephen Morse, a legal scholar, on the subject of neuroscience's relev-
ance to legal doctrine).
75. Id. at 7.
76. Daniel D. Langleben & Frank M. Dattilio, Commentary: The Future of Forensic
Functional Brain Imaging, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 502, 502-04 (2008).
77. Stacey A. Tovino, Current in Contemporary Ethics: The Confidentiality and Priva-
cy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 844, 847
(2005).
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A. Evidentiary Problems
Generally, courts have been willing to accept future dangerousness tes-
timony based on clinical judgment alone. This raises questions as to wheth-
er this relaxed approach, without any judicial inquiry as to scientific validi-
ty, meets the evidentiary standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceut-
icals, Inc,78 informally known as the Daubert test. 79 Beecher-Monas and
Garcia-Rill argue that it cannot meet those standards because it is "entirely
subjective, ungrounded in empirical data, and therefore unfalsifiable; has
been overwhelmingly castigated by the profession, and thus fails peer re-
view, publication, and general acceptance; has no standards for its metho-
dology; and cannot meet the requirements for an acceptable error rate.
80
They argue that even actuarial predictions, while more accurate, are tenuous
as a basis for depriving life and liberty.
81
The question arises as to whether brain-imaging technology, which on
the surface gives an imprimatur of "scientific," would improve the accuracy
of future dangerousness predictions and more nearly meet the Daubert stan-
dards. 82 The current state of brain-imaging technology for purposes of pre-
dicting future dangerousness would likely fail either the Daubert test, or the
much earlier and more permissive test for admissibility of evidence estab-
lished in Frye v. United States,83 informally known as the Frye test. 84 The
technology has only been tested in laboratory conditions, and there is no
standardization in the testing techniques.85 Moreover, error rates have not
been established, 86 and it has yet to be proven that the technology has indi-
vidualized reliability.87 Overall, there are significant doubts as to the general
acceptance of brain-imaging technology.88 Not the least of the admissibility
78. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
79. See id at 589-95. In order for expert scientific testimony to pass the Daubert test
and be admitted into evidence, the testimony must be considered (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 592-93.
The reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony must be scientifically valid, and
capable of being applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 593. Two factors to consider are (1)
whether the scientific theory or technique can be tested, and (2) whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication. Id. at 593.
80. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 21, at 307 n.26.
81. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predict-
ing Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOzO L. REv. 1845, 1900-01 (2003).
82. Moreno, supra note 7, at 735-37 (citing studies that suggest that brain scans and
cognitive neuroscience explanations enhance perceived validity).
83. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EvD. 702.
84. Id. at 1014 (requiring that the admissibility of evidence obtained through a scientific
technique or process depends upon that technique or process having general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community).
85. Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be True?, 36 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 495 (2008).
86. See Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Proce-
dure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 319-21 (2006); Moriarty, supra note 61, at 46-47. But see
Pettit, supra note 65, at 333-34.
87. See Pardo, supra note 86, at 319.
88. See Moriarty, supra note 61, at 46-47. But see Pardo, supra note 86, 321; Pettit, Jr.,
UALR LAW REVIEW
problems is the fact that the technology has not been shown to have indivi-
dualized reliability.
89
One of the difficulties with evidence involving neuroimaging is that
any evidentiary use involves the interpretation of the images themselves, as
well as inferences as to the psychological status of the individual. 90 The
neuroimaging expert need not be, and frequently would not be, a psychiatr-
ist. Yet, psychiatric expertise would be necessary for any diagnostic infe-
rences that might be drawn from the brain images. As one scholar points
out, "There is cause for concern when a psychiatrist uses an image of a sta-
tistically 'abnormal' brain to draw conclusions about a defendant's sanity,
criminal responsibility or dangerousness." 9' The imaging evidence may be
unduly persuasive in spite of the lack of scientific support for its use to di-
agnose cognitive or behavioral impairments.92 As a result, some psychiatric
testimony will always be necessary to tie the physiological status of the
brain to a mental disorder. Thus, the court will have to evaluate both the
validity of the particular brain imaging evidence offered ("technical validi-
ty") and the expert's inference ("inferential validity").
As to the technical validity, any evaluation by the court is not likely to
be difficult or controversial. The ability of the technology to depict what it
purports to depict is already accepted.93 The more difficult evidentiary issue
lies with the inferential validity, given the general skepticism toward psy-
chiatric opinion testimony.94 Courts will tend to exclude an expert opinion if
they find an "unfounded inferential leap" from the image to the behavior.95
Kulynych proposes adoption of Walker and Monahan's "social frame-
work" approach to provide a context for such "soft science." 96 The idea is
that general conclusions from scientific research may be useful in determin-
supra note 65, at 333-34.
89. Pardo, supra note 86, at 319.
90. Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal
Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1259-64 (1997).
91. Id. at 1251.
92. See Helen S. Mayberg, Functional Brain Scans as Evidence in Court: An Argument
for Caution, 33 J. NUCLEAR MED. 18N, 18N (1992); C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing
Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry: Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 211, 224-27 (1995).
93. Kulynych, supra note 90, at 1265 (suggesting that this evaluation is similar to that
for other areas of scientific evidence and the model is set out in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2000)).
94. See Edmund H. Mantell, A Modest Proposal To Dress the Emperor: Psychiatric and
Psychological Opinion in the Courts, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 53, 75-78 (1994) (suggesting
that much clinical testimony is unreliable and inadmissible under the Daubert test).
95. Moriarty, supra note 61, at 43.
96. Kulynych, supra note 90, at 1267 (citing Laurens Walker and John Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987)).
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ing factual issues in a specific case.97 The concept seems to fit here because
clinical opinion testimony must "draw from some sort of data base" to rend-
er a diagnosis or opinion. 98 Kulynych notes that "[i]n each case, the expert
witness attempts to extrapolate from a general corpus of research findings to
a prediction about the behavior or cognitive capacity of a particular individ-
ual."99
B. Fifth Amendment Issues
Neuroscientific evidence gathered for the purpose of predicting future
dangerousness may run counter to the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The privilege may prohibit forcing individuals to submit
to providing compelled and incriminating testimony. 1°° Certainly, some of
the uses of the technology outlined above would satisfy the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. Pardo concludes: "Namely, it would apply when the gov-
ernment compels the tests in order to obtain evidence of the incriminating
informational content of subjects' propositional attitudes." 10 1 What is not
clear, however, is whether the information obtained directly from the brain
is an "act" of communication or a "product" of communication. 10 The dis-
tinction may be of some importance in determining Whether the privilege
applies, given the Supreme Court's holding in Schmerber v. California,
involving blood samples.0 3 The distinction in Schmerber was between
"physical" evidence-such as blood tests, which does not raise the issue of
the Fifth Amendment privilege-and "testimonial" evidence, which does
raise the issue.'04 Physical evidence may be compelled; testimonial evidence
may not be. 10 5 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court focused on the
process by which the evidence was compelled, as opposed to the product of
the information revealed. 10 6 For example, in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, in an
effort to clarify the distinction, the Court referred back to Schmerber and the
passive role the defendant played in providing the evidence. 10 7 In the con-
text of neuroscience evidence, the question arises as to whether an fMRI or
EEG is physical or testimonial.'0 8 Brain imaging measures brain activity
that cannot be controlled by the subject. 109 In that sense, the process fits the
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1268.
99. Id.
100. Pardo, supra note 86, at 328.
101. Id. at331.
102. Id. at 329-33.
103. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
104. Id. at 764. See also Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as Protecting Mental Control, 42
AKRON L. REv. 763, 779-89 (2009); Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neuro-
technologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 359, 368-69
(2007).
105. Fox, supra note 104, at 780-81.
106. Id. at 786.
107. 496 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1990).
108. See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 104, at 367.
109. See id at 368-69.
UALR LAW REVIEW
mold of physical evidence." But the extortion of incriminatory thoughts
from the brain would seem to make the evidence testimonial, which would
then violate the Fifth Amendment."'
C. Fourth Amendment Issues
Fourth Amendment issues are also implicated in the use of neuroimag-
ing tests for at least some of the future dangerousness assessments. One can
argue that everyone has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" to brain de-
tails. Compelling such tests would seem to be a "search" under current in-
terpretations of the Fourth Amendment.1 12 Probable cause requirements
would be applicable. While the government might not be able to use the
techniques as "mental fishing expeditions, ' '... such tests could be compelled
without violating Fourth Amendment restrictions provided that probable
cause exists to believe the test would reveal evidence and that a warrant is
obtained (or a warrant exception is applicable).' 14
D. Privacy Issues
The use of technology for predicting of future dangerousness impli-
cates privacy issues. Tovino poses the question as follows: "Finally, and
regardless of the context, do all individuals have the right to cognitive pri-
vacy, or the privacy of their own thoughts? Can state action that punishes an
individual or holds an individual responsible for thoughts, but not actions,
violate the individual's cognitive privacy?"' 15 This latter concern has been
highlighted in the popular press with questions of how privacy could be
threatened by use of this technology. 1 6 The "fundamental liberty interest"
recognized by the Supreme Court as residing in the Due Process Clause has
included a right of personal privacy. Surely, this could include "security
from unwanted government intrusion into the mind."'"17
Henry T. Greely raises the question of whether the "forced intrusion
into one's mind" might be violative of due process." 8 He raises the issue
110. See id.
111. Seeid
112. Pardo, supra note 86, at 325.
113. Id. at327.
114. Id. at 325-26.
115. Tovino, supra note 77, at 848.
116. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience is Trans-
forming the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, at 50.
117. Sean Kevin Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in
Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1601, 1633-34 (2005).
118. Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible
Legal and Social Implications ofAdvances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:
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beyond the litigation context by speculating about a remote screening de-
vice which would require no obvious intrusion.119 Should such a device be
perfected, the privacy issues would be even more significant than those aris-
ing from use by consent. While this invasion of "self' raises privacy con-
cerns, Mobbs, Lau, Jones and Frith, remind us that:
[F]unctional brain imaging is not mind reading. Not only can it
not tell us what or how a person was thinking at the time of a le-
gally relevant act, it also cannot tell us with reliable accuracy
what a person is thinking while being scanned. In this respect,
brain imaging can only provide post hoc explanations.120
As Michael S. Gazzaniga emphasizes: "Neuroscience reads brains, not
minds." 121
VI. CONCLUSION
The future of the science of brain imaging is unlimited. As neuros-
cience develops and the related technology is perfected, calls for its use to
predict future behavior will increase. This poses what has been called a
"challenge to one of the central principles of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence: namely, that people are responsible for their behavior, not their proc-
livities-for what they do, not what they think., 122 A further caveat is of-
fered by Abigail A. Baird:
While human neuroscience has a great deal to offer with regard to
the likely causes of human behavior, it is not yet capable of pre-
dicting--or for that matter, explaining-any individual's specific
intentions or behaviors. It is tempting to draw great truth from
brightly colored pictures of brain activity (which are actually sta-
tistical maps of the probability of activity in those regions, not the
actual activity), but it would be wrong to do so with regard to the
actions of an individual.
1 23
Stephen J. Morse, only partially in jest, has characterized those who
make moral and legal claims about the relationship of new neuroscience to
criminal responsibility as suffering from "Brain Overclaim Syndrome."'
' 24
He is critical of the "[m]onolithic brain explanation of complex behavior"
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and suggests that any correlation between brain states and the criteria for
responsibility is a fantasy.
125
Morse warns that if causation (i.e., some abnormality detected by neu-
roscience techniques) is to be regarded as per se an excusing condition, "no
one could ever be responsible for anything. 1 26 Furthermore, if neuroscience
is to be used in criminal responsibility assessments for exculpatory purpos-
es, it could as easily be used to inculpate.
The latter point is illustrated by studies that show that the second most
powerful aggravating factor (next to the crime itself) for juries in death pe-
nalty cases is evidence of future dangerousness.1 27 Taken to the extreme, the
use of neuroscience techniques to aid in predicting future criminal behavior,
in these or any of the procedures where future dangerousness is an issue,
could vindicate the nineteenth century Italian criminologist, Lombroso.
125. Id. at404-05.
126. Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psy-
chology, 25 BEHAV. Sci. L. 203, 216 (2007).
127. See Snead, supra note 37, at 57.
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